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Why Full Implementation Is Long Overdue
BY MERRIL SOBIE AND JOHN D. ELLIOTT

I

n 1980, the American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated
a far-reaching comprehensive body of Juvenile Justice Standards, thereby providing a blueprint for the reform of a system
that had serious deficiencies. Developed in partnership with the
Institute of Judicial Administration (IJA) at New York University, the standards address the entire juvenile justice continuum,
from police handling and intake to adjudication, disposition,
juvenile corrections, and ancillary functions. Approximately
300 professionals collaborated for a decade to produce the 23
volumes approved by the ABA House of Delegates.
To this day, the standards remain relevant and reformist.
Several have been implemented in whole or in part. However,
since institutional resistance has compromised the meaningful
consideration of the standards as a whole, the ABA must redouble its efforts to promote their acceptance and implementation.
This article looks at the history of the standards’ development
and implementation, and delineates the need for updating several
provisions and the urgent need to advocate for their application.
MERRIL SOBIE is a law professor at Pace Law School in White Plains,
New York, where he specializes in family and children’s law. JOHN D.
“JAY” ELLIOTT is an attorney in private practice in Columbia, South
Carolina, where he has represented children and their parents for over
30 years.

24

In the Beginning

In 1971, the IJA concluded its path-breaking work as the secretariat for the completion and approval of the ABA Criminal
Justice Standards. It was thought, quite naturally, that a companion volume should address the juvenile justice system.
One volume ultimately grew to 23, as the principal leaders
discovered that juvenile justice and delinquency presented
a disparate picture of practices and procedures around the
country. A comprehensive solution was needed.
In 1973, the ABA became a cosponsor of the project,
which became known as the IJA-ABA Joint Commission on
Juvenile Justice Standards. Six years later, in 1979, the multivolume set of standards was submitted to the ABA House
of Delegates at its Midyear Meeting. The House of Delegates approved 17 volumes at that meeting, and three more
in 1980. Three standards were not approved by the ABA.
The standards regarding noncriminal misbehavior, or status offenses, were tabled due to opposition to their primary
goal, eliminating court jurisdiction over such offenses. The
volume governing schools and education was withdrawn
from consideration, and the standards on abuse and neglect
were revised but never resubmitted for ABA approval. (For
more background, see How It Began: A Brief History of the
Standards, page 27.)
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Resistance and Inertia

As the standards moved toward adoption by the ABA House
of Delegates, their principal organizer and director, Barbara
Flicker, envisioned a meaningful launch for national acceptance. In her Summary and Analysis of the standards, she
recommended a plan of implementation similar to that of the
ABA Criminal Justice Standards:
1. preparation of a state-by-state analysis comparing the
standards with laws, statutes, and rules in the various
jurisdictions;
2. appointment of an implementation task force of key
leaders in each state;
3. goal-setting and strategic development to coordinate
discussion of the standards with all components of the
criminal justice system; and
4. education of practitioners and the public about the
standards.
(Barbara Danziger Flicker, Standards for Juvenile Justice: A Summary and Analysis 261–62 (1977).)
Calling for a “massive drive” by the ABA to educate and
recruit advocates for the adoption of the standards, supported
with funding from foundations, nonprofits, and reform groups,
Flicker warned against the inertia of gradualism. The goal
was to avoid piecemeal adoption of discrete standards and
gain acceptance of the standards to overhaul the fragmented
juvenile justice system.
By 1980, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP) had invested significant sums of money in the
development of standards and guidelines to improve the functioning of the juvenile justice system. These included the
IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards, the National Advisory
Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Standards for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, and those
developed by the Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the National Advisory Committee on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. OJJDP also helped
fund the development of juvenile corrections standards by
the American Correctional Association.
On June 16, 1982, OJJDP announced a solicitation for a
demonstration program to further disseminate and implement
the standards. Entitled the National Juvenile Justice Standards
Resource and Demonstration Program, its objectives included
demonstration projects in six jurisdictions to test revision of
laws, court rules or policies reflecting the array of standards,
resource materials to assist in the consideration or adoption
of standards, and training.
Within a month, however, OJJDP abruptly cancelled the solicitation at the direction of the newly constituted National Advisory
Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
The committee was asked to reconsider, but refused. Ultimately
directed by the Appropriations Committee of the United States
House of Representatives to continue the standards demonstration project as originally proposed, the edict was ignored.
The abrupt withdrawal of federal support meant that
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standards efforts supported by the DOJ—those of the National
Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention and the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals—were effectively a dead
letter. The ABA was left to support and circulate the IJA-ABA
Juvenile Justice Standards on its own, which it did.
It did so, though, in the face of increasingly punitive policies directed at the problem of violent juvenile crime, as much
the subject of political hyperbole as concrete fact. With alarms
raised about the specter of juvenile “super-predators” during
the 1990s, many jurisdictions enacted legislation transferring
juvenile offenders to the adult criminal courts. Ironically, it
may be said that as the juvenile courts labored politically to
cling tenaciously to sanction runaways and truants, they ceded
responsibility for juveniles accused of serious offenses to the
adult criminal justice system.
In the mid-1990s, the Criminal Justice Section attempted a
revival of its juvenile justice standards initiative. (Robert E.
Shepherd Jr., ABA Juvenile Justice Standards: Anchor in the
Storm, Crim. Just., Winter 1996, at 39.) Its ability to do so,
however, was hamstrung by a limited budget and the political headwinds then prevailing.
Hence, the inertia and gradualism that Flicker warned
against affected the standards in the two decades after their
adoption. By 1975, she noted in her Summary and Analysis,
the ABA Criminal Justice Standards had been cited a total
of 3,664 times in appellate decisions around the country. By
comparison, the Juvenile Justice Standards, as of this writing, have been cited 60 times. That said, the Juvenile Justice
Standards have in great measure proven successful. Although
the project did not precipitate a juvenile justice “revolution,”
the inherent validity of the standards have greatly contributed
to the development of American juvenile justice.

Implementation

Although not the sweeping transformation of the system that
reformers desired, the standards have been at least partially
implemented, albeit on a more gradual and ad hoc basis than
expected, influencing judicial decisions, legislation, administrative directives, and the enactment of state standards.
Evolutionary acceptance has proceeded from the date of
promulgation to the present. Although full implementation
has not been achieved—and may never be achieved—the
guidelines’ continuing utilization is a testament to their efficacy and relevance. What follows are a few examples in the
life of the Juvenile Justice Standards.
First, the standards have been applied and cited in scores
of appellate cases. One recent example is the 2010 Alaska
Court of Appeals decision of B.F.L. v. State, in which the
court adopted the ABA Dispositional Standards:
To fill this [dispositional] legislative vacuum, this Court
exercised its common-law power to announce a standard that would govern the superior court’s choice of
disposition: We therefore recognize the standards promulgated by the IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards
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Project, Standards Relating to Dispositions . . . . [T]he
court must consider and reject less restrictive alternatives prior to imposition of more restrictive alternatives.
. . . The court must enter specific written findings why
the less restrictive alternatives are inappropriate in a
given case, and those findings must be supported by a
preponderance of the evidence.
(233 P.3d 1118, 1123 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (citing R.P.
v. State, 718 P.2d 168, 169 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).)
Similarly, in United States v. Juvenile, 347 F.3d 778 (9th
Cir. 2003), the court reversed a disposition that had violated
the dispositional standards. (See also In re Welfare of C.A.W.,
579 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that the
IJA-ABA dispositional purpose standard had been “in identical
form subsequently enacted by the Minnesota Legislature”).)
Several additional appellate decisions have been guided
by the standards relating to waiver or transfer of a juvenile
for adult criminal prosecution; see, for example, the Supreme
Court of Iowa case of State v. Wright, 456 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa
1990), and the federal case of People of Territory of Guam
v. Kingsbury, 649 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1981). The problematic
issue of waiver of counsel by a child has been addressed by
at least two appellate courts. Citing the standards, both decisions severely restricted waiver and required that counsel be
appointed and participate at a hearing to determine whether
waiver would be appropriate (the prewaiver appointment and
participation by counsel greatly limits, if not precludes, a decision to waiver). (State ex rel. J.M. v. Taylor, 276 S.E.2d 199
(W. Va. 1981); In re T.R.B., 325 N.W.2d 329 (Wis. 1982).)
Last, courts have applied the standards in cases that did not
involve juvenile justice. For example, the California Court
of Appeals cited the standards in a tort case initiated by an
emancipated minor. (Gore v. Stowe, 231 Cal. Rptr. 492 (Ct.
App. 1986).) The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
quoted the Standards Relating to Private Parties in concluding that an indigent parent is constitutionally entitled to the
appointment of counsel in a consent to adoption case. (Dep’t
of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 406 (Mass. 1979).)
Over the course of the past 30 years, several specific standards have also influenced and encouraged the enactment of
similar or identical state dispositional guidelines. For example,
West Virginia has adopted state dispositional standards that
replicate the IJA-ABA version. (See Facilities Review Panel
v. Coe, 420 S.E.2d 532, 535–36 (W. Va. 1992).) The Minnesota legislature has enacted the dispositional purpose clause
verbatim. (See In re Welfare of C.A.W., 579 N.W.2d 494,
497 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).) Most recently, Illinois enacted
legislation effective January, 2012, that allows juvenile court
judges to commit juveniles to confinement at disposition only
after efforts were made to locate less restrictive alternatives
and state reasons why those efforts were unsuccessful. (See,
Lisa Jacobs and Betsy Clark, Impact of Illinois’ Statutory
Change Mandating the Least Restrictive Alternative Standard, Models for Change Measureable Progress Series
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(2014), assessing the impact of the legislation.)
At a wider level, the standards have directly and indirectly
encouraged the promulgation of comprehensive juvenile
justice state standards to guide counsel and structure court
proceedings. For example, the New York State Bar Association has approved a series of standards for representing
children in a wide range of cases, including juvenile delinquency, status offenses, child protective, and child support.
(See NYSBA Comm. on Children and the Law, Standards for
Attorneys Representing Children (2011), available at http://
tinyurl.com/kojlyrq.) The New York standards were developed
in the late twentieth century and have been revised and updated
through several editions, and further revisions are pending.
Although the New York standards do not completely follow
the IJA-ABA version, most of the important ABA-suggested
doctrines are largely incorporated, such as the role of counsel,
the “least restrictive” dispositional rule, and the participation
of the child’s parents. Several other states have also promulgated standards that closely resemble the IJA-ABA model.
Perhaps the most significant legislative development
reflecting the IJA-ABA standards has been the right to counsel. New York effectively prohibited waiver in 1978. (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. Act § 249-a.) Although theoretically permitting
waiver, the section’s strictures have effectively prohibited
the practice; since 1978, there has been no reported case in
which waiver has been permitted. Several states, including
Minnesota and, more recently, Pennsylvania, have prohibited
waiver of counsel, while other states have severely limited the
practice. Tellingly, a national survey found that of 99 appeals
of waiver, the vast majority resulted in reversals. (See Mary
Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver
in the Juvenile Courts, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 577 (2002).)
The role of counsel is another related issue that has evolved
toward the ABA model. In 1979, the now-discredited “guardian ad litem” principles, whereby counsel advocates his or her
perceived view of the child’s best interests, prevailed throughout the country. Today, the prevailing model is far more akin
to the traditional client-driven representation paradigm (See
Juvenile Justice Standards: Standards Relating to Counsel
for Private Parties § 3.1.) The New York standards, for example, reflecting a court rule applicable to the representation of
children in every family court case, stipulates that “the child’s
attorney should maintain a traditional attorney-client relationship and zealously defend the child . . . there is a presumption
that the [child’s] attorney will abide by a client’s decision
concerning the objectives of representation.” (See N.Y. Rules
of the Chief Judge, 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7.2.) Although not universally accepted, particularly in child protective cases, the
contemporary paradigm is far closer to the attorney-client
relationship established by the IJA-ABA standards.
A parallel development has been the tentative movement
away from massive, largely rural custodial facilities for
delinquent youths to small, nonsecure community-based programs. (See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 353.3 (implementing
the “close to home” initiative, whereby nonsecure placements of juveniles adjudicated delinquent in New York City
must be within the metropolitan area).) Several states have
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implemented programs to reinvest dollars saved by limiting
the use of large juvenile institutions to enhance community-based options, both nonresidential and residential. (See
Nat’l Juvenile Justice Network, Bringing Youth Home: A
National Movement to Increase Public Safety, Rehabilitate
Youth and Save Money (2011).) The movement represents a
twenty-first century progressive change long advocated by the
standards, especially those relating to corrections and architecture of facilities, quite controversial in their day.
In sum, although the hopes for immediate reform were not
realized, the 30 years of post-standards history have seen a
gradual evolution toward implementation (not infrequently
a two-step advance followed by a one-step retreat). Much
remains to be accomplished. The standards nevertheless serve
as a contemporary beacon for the judiciary, state legislatures,
and the American bar. Writing in 1996, Robert Shepherd Jr.
observed, “The Standards today can still serve as that critical anchor for the juvenile justice system . . . . [T]he ultimate
product is as valuable today as it was in 1979 and 1980 when
the House of Delegates gave it its endorsement.” (Shepherd,
Anchor in the Storm, supra, at 41.) Professor Shepherd’s conclusions are equally salient today.

The Need for Further Implementation

The standards have been widely cited over the course of
several decades and, as noted, many have been gradually
implemented by several jurisdictions. However, some important standards have failed to gain traction; for those, the 2014
landscape is virtually identical to that of 1980.
One significant example is the minimum age of juvenile
delinquency responsibility. Section 2.1 of the Standards
Relating to Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions stipulates
an age range of “not less than ten and not more than seventeen years.” No state exceeds the maximum age, and in
recent years several have joined the overwhelming national
consensus by raising the age to 17. However, 35 states have
not established a minimum age (15 states have enacted minimums ranging from ages six to 10). In fact, prosecution of
the very young is prevalent. In 2011, approximately 45,000
cases involving children younger than 12 years of age were
referred for juvenile delinquency prosecution, and approximately 7,000 were adjudicated as delinquent. (See Nat’l Ctr.
for Juvenile Justice, Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985–2011, OJJDP, www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs
(the survey does not differentiate by age below 12).) Prosecuting the very young raises fundamental legal and moral
issues, including competency (how many six- or 10-yearolds understand judicial proceedings and can materially
assist in their defense?), mens rea or specific intent, and
diminished responsibility. The landmark twenty-first century
brain development studies documented by the MacArthur
Foundation (www.adjj.org), though focused on the older
adolescents, may be of particular relevance to their younger
“delinquent” colleagues and should encourage implementation of the long dormant standard. In fact, a strong argument
can be advanced for raising the minimum age standard from
age 10 to age 12.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE n Fall 2014

A second example is appeals. The standards advocate a
vibrant appellate process for every facet of the juvenile court
system, necessary to regulate often unfettered discretion, correct
errors, and develop precedent. Yet, as noted in a recent ABA
Criminal Justice Section Report to the House of Delegates,
the national rate of appeal for juvenile justice adjudications of
guilt is dismal—five appeals per 1,000 juvenile delinquency
convictions (the rate approaches zero percent in many states.)
(See Megan Annitto, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, 66 U. Miami
L. Rev. 671 (2012).) Viewing the crucial area of the appellate
process, the standards have had close to zero effect.
The above examples are illustrative; many additional standards, from among the voluminous whole, could be cited.
Much work remains to be done.

Amending the Standards

The comprehensive body of standards has met the test of time
remarkably well. Most are as relevant today as the day they
were approved. Implementation has been gradual and sporadic, in fact painfully slow. Gradualism is a salient argument
for reinvigoration, though, fortunately, the text as a whole
does not need major revision.
The passage of three decades accompanied by the inevitable intervening developments, however, has rendered several
specific provisions or groups of standards outdated. One
example is capacity. Section 3.5 of the Standards Relating to
Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions stipulates in its entirety:
Juvenile delinquency liability should not be imposed
if, at the time of the conduct charged to constitute the
offense, as a result of mental disease or defect, the
juvenile lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or
her conduct to the requirements of the law.
The standard is identical to its criminal law counterpart,
i.e., the rule applicable to adult criminal defendants. However,
the seemingly revolutionary techniques of adolescent brain
imaging and resultant biological studies recognized and incorporated in a growing number of court decisions, from the US
Supreme Court to the local juvenile courts, have rendered the
standard obsolete. We now know that the lack of capacity in
many youths is not the “result of mental disease or defect,”
but instead the result of normal but as yet incomplete brain
development. The crucial scientific findings should form the
basis of a revised standard (indeed, should be reflected in
several standards).
The standards are also virtually silent concerning the collateral consequences of a delinquency finding. Collateral
consequences were mild in 1975, but have burgeoned to
major importance. Similarly, the educational policy of “zero
tolerance” did not exist, but is now prevalent. To cite one
additional example, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, a
path for immigrant children to achieve permanent residency
and citizenship under federal law (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)
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(J)) has become a major issue in child protective, guardianship, and delinquency litigation. The provision surely
merits inclusion in the standards.
Several of the revisions outlined above would conform
the standards to current ABA policies. In fact, one need
only read ABA resolutions to draft contemporary standards
concerning zero tolerance, collateral consequences, and
appeals. Updating would maintain the standards’ currency
and would underscore their twenty-first century relevance.
It would be impractical, as well as unnecessary, to promulgate a complete second edition; what is needed is a
continuing endeavor to maintain timeliness. It’s good to
be able to say, as we have, that the standards have for the
most part retained their importance and relevance. It would
be better to say that the standards have been updated and
maintained to fully address the contemporary juvenile justice world.

Conclusion

What is needed is a reinvigoration of the standards through
enhanced dissemination and review, as well as a program to
selectively update and augment several specific provisions.
This is not a new idea—indeed it is overdue. In 1993, a working group empaneled by the ABA recommended just such a
rejuvenation and updating of the standards. (A.L. Higginbotham Jr., America’s Children at Risk: A National Agenda for
Legal Action, 74 (1993).)
The standards should be widely disseminated to national
legislative and judicial support organizations, such as the

National Center for State Courts, the National Judicial College,
and the National Conference of State Legislatures. Juvenile
justice and advocacy organizations, especially legal advocacy
organizations, should feature the standards and commentary on
their websites, including, for example, the National Juvenile
Defender Center, the National District Attorneys Association,
and the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.
The standards should also be widely circulated to practitioners, so that they may be cited and incorporated in their work.
This would include public defender organizations, appellate
public defense agencies, and law schools that maintain juvenile justice clinics or children’s law centers.
Finally, there should be a continuing ABA program to
gradually update those standards that need revision and add
new standards that address twenty-first century cutting edge
issues and ABA policy, as has been done for the Criminal
Justice Standards.
As Barbara Flicker observed in her Summary and Analysis, the IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards are an invaluable
asset “packed with treasures: studies, statistics, decisions,
references, well-defined positions, and carefully reasoned
justifications.” (Flicker, A Summary and Analysis, supra, at
270.) They merit renewed attention by practitioners, decision
makers, and policy makers. The standards light the path to
affording children due process and dignity, while distinguishing between minor and serious youthful misconduct. They are
essential to protect the public, return confidence in the juvenile justice system, and afford our children a fair adjudication
and rehabilitative environment. n
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